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Abstract
Households have choices when it comes to reducing waste sent to landfills: reduction of consumption
or packaging, reuse of goods purchased, or recycling. In this paper, we adopt a holistic approach to
the analysis of these choices as separate but related facets of households’ waste management behaviour.
Theoretically, households produce waste as a by-product of their consumption and must then deal with
it either by curbside disposal or by recycling. To the extent that managing additional waste is costly
even if only in terms of time, households may also engage in waste prevention, that is, produce less
waste by reducing their consumption level and/or changing their consumption patterns in favour of
less waste-intensive products. As curbside disposal, waste prevention and recycling relate to the same
problem and are linked via several constraints, we employ a three-equation mixed process estimation
strategy which allows for the error terms of the three equations to be correlated. For the study, we
rely on an original data set that permits defining waste prevention comprehensively from a list of 19
waste prevention activities, that provides for a more balanced policy representation (in terms of presence
versus absence of unit pricing), and that covers a wide range of attitudinal elements, values, and norms.
Given the richness of the data set, we also examine individuals’ decisions over recyclable items that carry
a refundable deposit in terms of both purchasing and returning habits, with particular attention to the
interaction between a refundable deposit system and unit pricing.
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1 Introduction
Household waste constitutes one of the main components of municipal waste: in 2011, for example, house-
holds produced over 75% of municipal waste in Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, and United Kingdom, and more
than 49% in all OECD countries (OECD, 2013b). Although municipal waste represents only a small frac-
tion of the total waste generated (about 10%), its management and treatment tend to be resource-intensive,
often requiring more than one-third of the public sector financial efforts earmarked for the abatement and
control of pollution (OECD, 2013b).
From 1990 to 2012, the quantity of municipal waste generated in OECD countries increased by 22.5%
from over 537 million tonnes to about 658 million tonnes; municipal waste per capita rose instead by 6%
from 500 kg per capita to 530 kg per capita. However, this growth was accompanied by a substantial
increase in the proportion of waste recovered through recycling and composting, from 19% in 1990 to
34% 2012, and, correspondingly, a substantial decrease in the proportion of waste landfilled from 60% to
45%, while the proportion of incinerated waste increased slightly from 20% to 22% (OECD 2014). Canada
experienced the lowest increase in recovery rate from 22% in 1996 to 24% in 2010, while Italy and the
United Kingdom experienced the largest increases from 5% and 7% in 1995 to 37% and 42% in 2011; in
2010, (i) Japan had the lowest recovery rate (19%), followed by Canada (24%) and the U.S.A. (34%),
while Germany had the largest (63%), (ii) Canada had the largest proportion of waste landfilled (72%),
followed by the U.S.A. (54%), while Germany and Japan had the lowest (0% and 1%), and (iii) Japan had
the largest proportion of waste incinerated (76%), while Canada had the lowest (4%).1
In addition to improvements in recovery rates, waste increased at a lower rate than private final con-
sumption expenditure for most of the OECD countries over the 1990 to 2012 period: only seven experienced
a growth rate in per capita municipal waste in excess of the growth rate in per capita private final consump-
tion expenditure, and, in half of the remaining countries, per capita municipal waste actually decreased.2
This decrease is certainly emblematic of a move towards more environmentally sustainable consumption
patterns, but much work is still needed as large amounts of waste continue to be generated and landfill
1Although we do not separate between incineration with energy recovery and incineration without energy recovery due to
lack of consistent data across the seven countries and over the 12-year period, most of the incineration within the countries
for which we have data was carried out with energy recovery, at least in more recent years. In 2012, France incinerated 32% of
its municipal waste with energy recovery and 1% without recovery; in 2010, over 93% of Japan’s incineration was with energy
recovery; all of the incineration in Italy, U.K., and U.S.A. in the last year for which we have data (2011 in the first two cases
and 2010 in the last case) was with energy recovery (OECD, 2014).
2For the per capita municipal waste growth rates, we use the 1990 and 2012 figures if they are available; otherwise, we use
the earliest post-1990 available figure and the latest pre-2012 available figure.
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remains the main disposal method in most OECD countries.
Much of the focus of academic and policy work in the household waste area has been on improving
upon our understanding of what determines households’ waste management decisions, most notably with
respect to waste disposal and recycling. Not surprisingly, academic interest in the subject matter has shifted
away from theoretical formulations of households’ waste management, which have characterized the early
literature, to empirical analyses informed by, and consistent with, policy makers’ waste reduction efforts
in response to increased interest in devising policies to induce greener lifestyles and more environmentally
sustainable consumption patterns. A common policy approach has entailed an emphasis on encouraging
reduction, reuse of products or packaging, and recycling (i.e., the “three R’s”). While reducing, reusing,
and recycling are distinct facets of waste management, and often treated as separate policy targets, the
decision to engage in one activity (e.g., reducing) is not independent of the decisions to engage in the
other activities. Accordingly, we offer a comprehensive study of household waste management by jointly
modelling the three decisions, contributing to the empirical literature in the area along several fronts.
First and foremost, we examine the determinants of engagement in waste prevention activities. Most
of the studies to date focus on waste disposal or recycling or both; the few studies that consider source
reduction and, specifically, how it responds to the implementation of unit pricing, draw their conclusions
by estimating the effect on a total waste variable, which comprises disposed of and recycled wastes (e.g.,
Nestor and Podolsky, 1998; Hong, 1999; Van Houtven and Morris, 1999) or includes compostable waste in
addition to unsorted and recyclable wastes (e.g., Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2004), or by comparing the effects
on waste disposal and recycling (e.g., Kinnaman and Fullerton, 2000). The only studies that attempt to
measure waste prevention directly are Ferrara and Missios (2012 and 2014) but both can only narrowly
define waste prevention because of data limitations. However, waste prevention encompasses much more
than using refillable containers, reusable bags, paper with recycled content, and products with reduced
packaging or toxic content. In this paper, we try to be as comprehensive as possible and include 19
activities, which we list in Table A.1 in the Appendix, in order to gauge waste prevention behaviour more
accurately.
A second important contribution of this paper stems from its holistic approach to the study of waste
management activities. A common feature of the existing empirical studies of household waste is that they
consider waste disposal and reduction activities separately. Due to data constraints, most of these studies
examine total discarded waste or recycling and the few that look at more than one activity (e.g., Hong
et al., 1993; Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1996; Nestor and Podolsky, 1998; Hong and Adams, 1999; Sterner
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and Bartelings, 1999; Van Houtven and Morris, 1999; Kinnaman and Fullerton, 2000; Linderhof et al.,
2001; Dijkgraaf & Gradus, 2004; Ferrara and Missios, 2012) treat them as unrelated. The two exceptions
are Hong (1999), which adopts a simultaneous equation model to allow for feedback effects between total
waste generation and recycling, and Ferrara and Missios (2014), which employs a multivariate binary probit
model to estimate the probabilities of specific engagement levels in mixed waste disposal, recycling, and
waste prevention jointly but on an individual-specific basis allowing for correlation across the three binary
choices. In this paper, we apply a new but extremely flexible procedure that utilizes maximum likelihood
estimation (CMP or conditional mixed process) to estimate a three-equation model of household waste
management involving a categorical variable for waste disposal, a categorical variable for recycling, and
a continuous variable for waste prevention. The flexibility of the CMP module rests upon its ability to
deal with a multi-equation system in either a seemingly unrelated regression setup, in which the dependent
variables are generated by processes that are independent except for correlated errors, or a simultaneous
equation framework, in which endogenous variables influence one another. The most salient features of
this tool are that the data-generating processes within the multi-equation system can be mixed, different
samples can be used for different models within the system via the inclusion of the Heckman selection
model, and switching regressions can be implemented to allow for the modelling of variables to depend on
the data.3
A third key contribution of this paper relates to the stratified nature of the data collection premised
on the requirement that the sample be adequately representative of communities with some sort of unit
pricing system to finance garbage collection services; the implication of this policy stratification is that we
have a data set which is well balanced in terms of observations from communities with and without unit
pricing programs. While the number of communities implementing user fees for garbage collection has
increased drastically over the years,4 the potentially higher administrative burden of unit pricing, likely
coupled with monitoring cost concerns associated with the possibility of illegal forms of disposal in response
to the program, has resulted in smaller-sized communities favouring the switch to unit pricing. As such
communities tend to be under-represented in national and international random sampling of households
precisely because of their size, it is challenging to draw conclusive statements about the effectiveness of
unit pricing (or lack thereof) when empirical findings do not support the benefits postulated on the basis of
theoretical considerations. Of the studies employing household-level data from communities with differing
3See Roodman (2011) for a complete description of CMP.
4In the U.S.A., for example, the number of jurisdictions with some sort of pay-as-you-throw or unit pricing program
increased from about 1,000 in 1993 to almost 7,100 in 2006 or about 25 percent of all U.S. communities (Skumatz and
Freeman 2007).
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policy regimes to fund the collection of curbside waste (e.g., Sterner and Bartelings, 1999; Jenkins et al.,
2003; Ferrara and Missios, 2005, 2012, and 2014), all but Ferrara and Missios (2005) lack strong evidence
in support of the hypothesis of positive environmental benefits under user charges via less waste disposal,
more recycling, and/or more waste prevention. The data sets in Jenkins et al. and Ferrara and Missios
(2012 and 2014) share the feature of being under-represented in terms of observations from communities
with unit pricing; on the other hand, the data set in Ferrara and Missios (2005), which is however confined
to the study of recycling in a single Canadian province (Ontario), is rather balanced with about 40 percent
of the surveyed households paying by the bag.
As a final contribution in the empirical analysis of the three waste management strategies, we utilize the
most comprehensive survey to date in that it not only covers all aspects of household waste management
behaviour (curbside disposal, recycling, and waste prevention) and all factors previously considered in
the literature (in separate and independent studies) but it also includes additional elements to capture a
range of influences most consistent with a complete view of decision-making and conducive to the study of
possible complementarities or substitutabilities across different behavioural motivators.5
There are two other themes related to waste management which we consider in this paper as we
exploit the richness of the data set. One of the two themes concerns the recycling of different types of
materials (glass, plastic, newspapers and magazines, cardboard, aluminum, and food waste); the other
theme pertains to the buying and returning of recyclables under a refundable deposit system, two waste
management activities which largely remain unexplored in household-level studies. In the former case, the
contributions to the literature amount, for the most part, to the same contributions as those above detailed
in relation to the three waste management options, namely, (1) a holistic approach that allows to capture
possible correlation possibilities between the intensities of recycling different materials, (2) a sample that
is more balanced in terms of representation of communities with and without unit pricing resulting from
the sample stratification strategy adopted for the data collection, and (3) a comprehensive data set that
covers a wide range of behavioural influences. In the latter case, the main contribution to the literature
rests upon the questions themselves which, ultimately, should aid in our objective to shed some light on the
5More recent empirical studies in the area explore the relevance of attitudinal characteristics (e.g., Ferrara and Missios,
2012), the effects of social and moral motives (e.g., Berglund and Matti, 2006; Halvorsen, 2008; Brekke et al., 2010; Ferrara
and Missios, 2012 and 2014), and whether policy tools such as unit pricing and mandatory recycling tend to crowd in or crowd
out intrinsic motivation for environmentally sound waste management choices (e.g., Ferrara and Missios, 2012 and 2014).
The inclusion of attitudinal factors such as environmental concerns, norms, and values as determinants of behaviour reflects
the realization that a better understanding of how people formulate judgements and make decisions in the waste area and,
more generally, in any environment-related consumption area necessitates approaching decisions from a broader mindset that
accounts for the sociological and psychological dimensions of decision making, in addition to the economic dimension, and for
the interplay among different types of motivations.
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effectiveness of refundable deposit systems at encouraging recycling and how it interacts with the presence
of unit pricing.
In the section that follows, we detail the empirical framework in terms of our data and variables. We
provide the results in section 3. Finally, in section 4, we present concluding remarks.
2 Empirical Framework
In this paper, we adopt a holistic approach to the study of the determinants of households’ waste manage-
ment behaviour. Theoretically, households produce waste as a by-product of their consumption and must
then deal with it either by curbside disposal or by recycling. To the extent that managing additional waste
is costly even if only in terms of time, households may also engage in waste prevention, that is, produce
less waste by reducing their consumption level and/or changing their consumption patterns in favour of
less waste-intensive products (such as choosing products with less packaging). Households then entertain
three options: (1) curbside disposal, (2) recycling, and (3) waste prevention. As these options relate to
the same problem and are, in fact, linked via several constraints,6 it is reasonable to hypothesize that, al-
though we can express the level of engagement in each option in reduced form and thus only as a function
of exogenous variables, any unsystematic factor affecting the decision over a particular aspect of waste
management has implications for the other aspects: a labour dispute in garbage collection services which
affects waste disposal through the error term in the waste disposal equation is likely to affect recycling
and waste prevention activities through the error terms in the recycling and waste prevention equations; a
technological shock that increases the recyclability of the waste content of consumption goods translates
into a positive random effect on waste prevention but is also likely to result into a positive random effect
on recycling and a negative random effect on waste disposal.
Hence, the three waste management equations combine into a seemingly unrelated (SUR) system in the
sense that no endogenous variable appears on the right-hand side of the other equations; however, their
errors are correlated and share a multivariate normal distribution. While estimating the three equations
separately would produce consistent estimates of parameters, results would tend to be less efficient as their
generating process would ignore the full covariance structure of the multi-equation system. Needless to
say, on matters of policy, the ability to predict accurately is particularly relevant as policy adjustments are
6Constraints linking the various waste management options are: (1) a waste constraint according to which waste production,
which is a positive function of consumption, is equal to the sum of waste discarded (legally or illegally) and waste recycled;
(2) a time constraint according to which an individual’s total time endowment is equal to the sum of amounts of time spent at
work, on leisure activities, and on waste management activities (e.g., sorting recyclables); (3) an income constraint according
to which total income earned is equal to the sum of expenditures on consumption and waste management (e.g., use fee).
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administratively costly and politically unwelcoming, especially for large-scale projects.
In addition to estimating the intensity of engagement in curbside disposal, recycling, and waste pre-
vention, we explore the recycling decision more thoroughly by considering behavioural similarities and
differences across various recyclables, namely, glass, plastic, newspapers and magazines, cardboard, alu-
minum cans, and food waste. For the same reasons as those above highlighted in support of the existence of
linkages between any two waste management options via unsystematic effects, we postulate that a random
event affecting the probability of recycling more of a particular recyclable item triggers random effects in
the recycling intensity decisions over the other recyclable materials. We thus estimate the six recycling
intensity decisions simultaneously with ordered probit models linked via their error terms.7
Finally, given the richness of the data set, we are able to examine individuals’ decisions over recyclable
items that carry a refundable deposit (that is, glass and plastic bottles and aluminum cans) in terms
of both purchasing and returning habits. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt at
exploring the interaction between a refundable deposit system for particular recyclables and unit pricing
and, specifically, the effects of unit pricing on individuals’ decisions over (1) whether to buy containers
with refundable deposits and (2) the proportion of containers with refundable deposits returned for partial
or full refund (i.e., return intensity).
In estimating the parameters of the regression model for the return intensity decision, we recognize
that our sample of individuals who buy containers with refundable deposits may suffer from selection on
unobservables as the errors that determine the likelihood of buying containers with refundable deposits
may be correlated with the errors determining the proportion of containers returned for refund: individuals
may make a decision to buy containers with refundable deposits based on the proportion of containers they
would return for refund. To account for said correlation, we estimate the parameters of an ordered probit
sample-selection model for the return intensity outcome with selection on buying containers with refundable
deposits. Even though our interest is on the ordinal outcome, the model involves two dependent variables as
we need to model the sample selection process. We thus have the ordinal outcome (i.e., the return intensity)
and a binary variable that indicates whether buying containers with refundable deposits is observed. We
model the two dependent variables jointly as functions of the same covariates and normally distributed
error terms which may be correlated. Based on the estimation results, however, we can only find support
for the hypothesis of correlated error terms for glass containers. We then model the two decisions for
7We recognize that it would be more accurate to refer to the food waste recycling decision as the composting decision.
However, for ease of exposition given the estimation strategy we employ and in accordance with the phrasing of the relevant
survey questions with food waste treated as a type of recyclable, we adopt the convention of labelling composting as food
waste recycling.
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plastic containers and aluminum cans separately but also provide the results of the disjoint estimation of
the buying and returning probabilities for glass containers.
2.1 Data
The collection of the data for our study was funded by SSHRC (Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council) and carried out by GMI (Global Market Insite), now Lightspeed GMI, in 2013 through a web-
based panel that involved 11,013 respondents living in target municipalities across the U.S.A. and Canada.8
One of the major shortcomings of previous studies is the limited number of observations from municipalities
with unit pricing. Although user charges are more common nowadays, their use remains rare compared
to the flat-fee alternative (e.g., through property taxes) and is often restricted to small municipalities. In
order to ensure a well represented sample from communities with some sort of pay-as-you-throw programme
for garbage pick-up and disposal, we constrained the data collection to a selected sample of municipalities
both in the U.S.A. and in Canada which we chose according to (1) presence/absence of unit pricing and
(2) size. In the U.S.A., for each community without unit pricing (NO PAYT), we attempted to identify
a community with unit pricing (PAYT) within the same state and, to the extent possible, of comparable
size; we could not apply a similar pairing strategy in Canada where communities with unit pricing remain
concentrated in the provinces of British Columbia and Ontario, but we did ensure a balance between the
PAYT and NO-PAYT communities in terms of number of communities and number of respondents within
each group. Finally, to retain the possibility of accounting for community-specific effects in the empirical
analysis, we tried the ensure that we would have at least 100 observations per community; in all but four
cases, which fall under the PAYT category in Canada, we met the threshold.9
In determining the target communities, we did not attempt to differentiate across different types of
unit pricing mechanisms out of practical considerations, that is, to avoid an additional layer of target
restrictions which would have complicated and likely incapacitated the data collection, but we did include
in the survey a question about garbage collection financing mechanism in one’s community and provided
the following options: (1) property taxes, (2) volume-based unit charge/price (per bag, container/cart,
etc.), (3) weight-based unit charge/price (per kilogram, pound, etc.), (4) frequency-based charge/price,
(5) other, and (6) don’t know. Interestingly, 28% of the respondents do not know how they pay for their
8See Table A.2 in the Appendix for summary information about the selected municipalities.
9We provide the list of communities by country (U.S.A. or Canada) and type (PAYT or NO PAYT) in Table A.2. We
have four regions, each consisting of 14 communities: regions 1 and 2 include PAYT and NO-PAYT communities from the
U.S.A.; regions 3 and 4 include PAYT and NO-PAYT communities from Canada. Of the 11,013 responses collected, 25% are
from region 1, 28% from region 2, 23% from region 3, and 24% from region 4; 48% of the responses are thus from PAYT
communities. For the Canadian panel, a French version of the questionnaire was available and 5% of the 5,128 Canadian
participants, mostly from Montreal and Quebec City, opted for it (see Table A.5).
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garbage collection and disposal, 10% indicate other types of mechanisms, 44% list property taxes, 9% pay by
volume, 1% pay by weight, and 10% pay according to frequency. It is clear that, aside from a large number
of uncertain individuals, there is quite a bit of discrepancy between how garbage collection is financed and
how individuals perceive it to be financed. This discrepancy provides us with an additional opportunity to
examine the effectiveness of unit pricing by separating between the informed and uninformed respondents
within the same policy region through the inclusion of a variable interacting the policy region with the
perceived garbage collection financing mechanism; this discrepancy also gives us a chance to consider the
relevance of the information dimension of waste management.
Based on the figures in Table A.4 in the Appendix, which gives a cross-tabulation of respondents by
region and answer to the question about garbage collection financing mechanism, we note that (1) U.S.
respondents are more likely to be unaware of how their garbage collection is financed than Canadian re-
spondents are (32% and 34% in regions 1 and 2 versus 20% and 22% in regions 3 and 4), (2) respondents
from PAYT communities are as likely to be unaware as those from NO-PAYT communities are, (3) respon-
dents from PAYT communities are more likely to be misinformed about how their garbage collection is
financed than respondents from NO-PAYT communities are (15% versus 6% in the U.S.A. and 66% versus
2% in Canada),10 (4) U.S. respondents are more likely to suggest paying for garbage collection through
a mechanism other than one based on property taxes, volume, weight, or frequency than Canadian re-
spondents are (13% and 14% in regions 1 and 2 versus 4% and 6% in regions 3 and 4), and (5) Canadian
respondents are more likely to report paying for garbage collection through property taxes when their
communities rely on unit pricing but less likely to report paying user fees when their communities rely
on property taxes than U.S. respondents are (66% versus 15% and 2% versus 6%). The last point may
relate to the age difference between U.S. and Canadian unit pricing programs, with the latter relatively
new compared to the former; as we can expect a time lag between the implementation of a new program
and the realization of its implementation through experience, respondents with less experience are more
likely to be misinformed.
2.2 Variables
As we consider separate but related decisions in this paper, to avoid cluttering the exposition, we structure
the discussion in this subsection under two headings: one about the dependent variables corresponding
to the three waste management decisions (garbage disposal, overall recycling, and waste prevention), the
10These figures simply reflect the proportions of respondents reporting paying for garbage collection through property taxes
in PAYT communities and through volume- or weight-based fees in non-PAYT communities.
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six material-specific recycling decisions (glass, plastic, newspapers and magazines, cardboard, aluminum
cans, and food waste), and the purchase and return decisions of returnable containers under a refundable
deposit system; the other about independent variables broken down by type and whether they matter in
all or a subset of the decisions.
2.2.1 Dependent Variables
In designing the questionnaire, we made sure to include a fairly comprehensive set of questions that would
provide a good measure of waste prevention efforts. To date, very little is known about household waste
prevention; due to data limitations, household waste management studies have in fact focused on waste
disposal and recycling. To our knowledge, the only studies that try to address the waste prevention
dimension of household waste management are Ferrara and Missios (2012) and Ferrara and Missios (2014).
However, in both instances, waste prevention can only be narrowly defined based on two questions: in
the 2012 paper, participation in waste prevention is proxied by the act of taking recycling logos into
account during purchasing decisions, while extent of participation in waste prevention is proxied by how
regularly (from never to always) refillable containers are purchased/used; in the 2014 paper, engagement in
quantitative waste prevention is equated with regularly using refillable containers and reusable bags, while
engagement in qualitative waste prevention is equated with regularly using paper with recycled content
and products with reduced toxic content.
In this paper, we employ a list of 19 questions covering a wide range of waste prevention activities and
can thus measure waste prevention more comprehensively and accurately. In deciding about whether and
how to combine the 19 statements to measure engagement in waste prevention, we use the Cronbach’s α
to determine the degree to which the 19 statements measure the same construct. With an α value of 0.92,
there is excellent internal consistency which does not improve but falls slightly if we remove one at the
time each of the 19 items (see Table A.5 in the Appendix);11 we are thus confident that we can combine
the 19 items into a single index and do so by employing weighting based on factor analysis (W PREV FA).
Given the ordinal nature of the variables associated with the 19 statements, we carry out factor analysis
using the matrix of polychoric correlations as opposed to the matrix of Pearson correlations which assume
interval measurement scales and are thus not suitable for studying the degree of association between
categorical variables. If we think of two ordinal variables as resulting from discretizing or categorizing
continuous random variables, the polichoric correlation between two ordinal variables is then the maximum
likelihood estimate of the correlation between the two unobserved continuous variables that underlie the
11As a rule of thumb, internal consistency is acceptable if 0.7 ≤ α < 0.8, good if 0.8 ≤ α < 0.9, and excellent if α ≥ 0.9.
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two observed ordinal variables under the assumption that the two unobserved continuous variables follow a
bivariate normal distribution. Although we reject the hypothesis of normally distributed data based on both
the likelihood ratio test, with χ2(15) = 981.9, and the Pearson goodness of fit test, with χ2(15) = 1016.43,
we justify the use of the polychoric coefficient matrix by relying on the discussion in Pearson and Heron
(1913) which demonstrates that, even with markedly skewed distributions, the Gaussian theory gives first
approximations of the correlation coefficients within ±0.05 of their true values; hence, for the purpose of
computing polychoric correlation coefficients, and particularly for large samples, whether the actual joint
distribution differs from the normal distribution is practically inconsequential.
To construct a waste prevention index using the factor analysis results, we adopt the same methodology
as in Nicoletti et al. (2000), cited in OECD/JRC (2008), which involves weighting at two levels: (1) the
intermediate weighting of the detailed items associated with each of the extracted factors according to
their contributions to the variance explained by the factor and (2) the final weighting of the extracted
factors according to their contributions to the variance in the data. In extracting the number of factors to
retain upon applying the principal-component factor method to the analysis of the matrix of polychoric
correlation coefficients,12 we follow the standard practice of focusing on factors that (1) are associated with
eigenvalues larger than unity, (2) individually contribute to the overall variance of the data by more than
10 percent, and (3) cumulatively contribute to the overall variance of the data by more than 60 percent.
After identifying the number of factors necessary to represent the data, we rotate the factors in an attempt
to minimize the number of basic items that have a high loading on the same factor, thus simplifying the
interpretation of the results as, after rotation, each item is associated with only one factor and each factor
represents only a small number of items. From the initial (pre-rotation) factor solution, we identify three
factors to retain which satisfy the first and third of the above three requirements;13 we then rotate these
factors via the orthogonal “varimax” rotation method (with Kaiser normalization), the most common of
the rotation methods, which maximizes the sum of the variances of the squared loadings across the factors.
Upon rotation, we compute squared loadings and scale them to unity sum, we assign items to factors based
on the magnitude of their scaled squared loadings and thus associate items C, J, K, L, N, and S with factor
12There are several methods to analyze the correlation matrix: principal factor, principal-component factor, iterated
principal-component factor, and maximum-likelihood factor methods. By the principal-component factor method, linear
combinations of the basic indicators are formed such that the first component (combination) accounts for the largest amount
of variability in the data, the second component, which is uncorrelated with the first, for the next largest amount, and so on
so forth. As noted in OECD/JRC (2008), factor extraction by the principal-component factor method is the most common
approach, preferred in the development of composite indicators because it is simple and allows for the construction of weights
reflecting the information content of individual indicators.
13In the initial factor solution, the eigenvalues of the first three factors are 8.9513, 1.53351, and 1.01216, respectively; the
corresponding proportions of variance accounted for individually are 47.11 percent, 8.07 percent, and 5.33 percent, so that the
first three factors explain 60.51 percent of the overall variance of the data.
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1, items A, B, D, E, F, and G with factor 2, and items H, I, M, O, P, Q, and R with factor 3, and, finally, we
re-scale the relevant squared loadings within each factor to unity sum and multiply the re-scaled squared
factor loading of each item by the proportion of the variance explained by the factor representing the item.
We provide a summary of the computational steps on the post-rotation results in Table A.6, with the last
column containing the weights corresponding to the various items which we use in constructing an index
measuring the extent of engagement in waste prevention.
For the garbage disposal and recycling decisions, the construction of the dependent variables is much
more straightforward as we only have to deal with two questions in the former case and with one question
in the latter case. For the garbage disposal decision, we define the dependent variable (GARBAGE) as the
interval within which the average number of full standard-sized bags disposed of at each collection falls.
In constructing this variable, we rely on two questions: one question pertains to how garbage is placed at
the curb, that is, whether by bag or by container/cart and, if by the latter option, in which size; the other
question relates to the number of full or partially full standard-sized bags or containers/carts placed, on
average, at the curb per collection.14,15
For the recycling decision, we construct an ordinal variable (REC PROP ) which gives the proportion
of recyclables that is recycled, excluding containers returned for refunds of deposits. This variables takes
on values from 1, which denotes zero recycling, to 5, which denotes 100 percent recycling, with 2, 3, and 4
thus representing 25 percent, 50 percent, and 75 percent, respectively. We adopt the same value assignment
strategy for the material-specific recycling decisions: an ordinal variable giving the proportion of recyclable
Y actually recycled (PROP Y ), where Y = glass, plastic, newspapers and magazines, cardboard, aluminum
cans, and food waste, respectively, which we employ in the joint estimation of the recycling decisions across
the six types of recyclables.
The last two dependent variables we construct relate to our analysis of refundable deposit systems: the
proportion of type-Z (glass containers, plastic containers, or aluminum cans) containers/cans returned for
refund (PROP Z RET ), and an indicator for buying type-Z containers/cans (PROP Z BUY ).
14We conjecture that a partially full bag/container/cart, other than the last one reported, is equivalent to 75 percent of a
full bag/container/cart and the last partially full bag/container/cart is equivalent to 50 percent of a full bag/container/cart.
For respondents disposing of garbage in containers/carts, we convert the number of containers/carts into standard-sized bags
using that a standard bag corresponds to a 16 gallon container/cart and that the size of a container/cart is equal to the
mid-point of its size range. For the few cases in which respondents report using containers/carts of different sizes, we derive
the equivalency in terms of standard-sized bags based on the average size of the containers/carts used.
15In Table A.7, we provide a visual of the interaction possibilities between the two questions (one about disposal option,
that is, whether by bag or container/cart; the other about quantity of bags or containers/carts). In some cases, there exist
discrepancies (e.g., reporting to place bags at the curb but providing the quantity only in terms of containers/carts). In the
Table, we include the number of cases for each interaction possibility and indicate how we determine quantity of bags in each
case.
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2.2.2 Independent Variables
In understanding the various household waste decisions we consider in this paper, we account for different
types of determinants, from the typical individual, household, and contextual characteristics, which are
common across the three waste management strategies under scrutiny (i.e., garbage disposal, recycling, and
waste prevention), to attitudinal factors, to policy instruments.16 Beginning with the common variables, we
have gender and age of respondent as the only individual characteristics. For household characteristics, we
have: household age distribution, highest level of formal education achieved in household, and household
income. For contextual characteristics, we have: number of years spent in neighborhood, ownership of
residence, and type of residence. To the extent that the contextual characteristics are more about the local
context, they are not as likely to be relevant in the waste prevention decision as they are in the garbage
disposal and recycling decisions which have more of a local dimension than waste prevention does.
In terms of attitudinal factors, we include some generic statements about trust in key bodies and the
environment and some specific to waste prevention and recycling, each measuring the extent of agreement
on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating strong disagreement and 5 strong agreement. For trust, we
have: (1) governments are trustworthy, (2) environmental non-governmental organizations (NOGs) are
trustworthy, and (3) producers and retailers are trustworthy, with the latter variable likely to be of greater
influence in the waste prevention decision which, in many respects, is a consumption decision and thus
reliant on information from producers and retailers. For the environment, we have: (1) the state of
the environment is of concern (ENV CNCRN), (2) individuals can contribute to a better environment
(BETTRENV ), (3) environmental impacts are frequently overstated (OV RSTATE), (4) environmental
issues should be dealt with primarily by future generations (FUTRGNRS), (5) environmental issues
will be resolved primarily through technological progress (TECHPROG), and (6) environmental policies
introduced by the government to address environmental issues should not cost extra money (NOTCOSTS).
Combining the 5 statements about the environment into an environmental attitude index is not an option
with a Cronbach’s α value of 0.59, which improves only marginally increasing to 0.61 when we omit the
last statement and decreases when we omit anyone of the other statements, and an average inter-item
covariance of 0.21.17
Additional attitudinal factors we account for in the empirical analysis relate to a single activity, which we
refer to, in what follows, as activityX, whereX can be either recycling or waste prevention. Hence, we have:
16See Table A.8 in the Appendix for a complete listing of the variables by type.
17Poor internal consistency across statements 2 through 6 is also found in Ferrara and Missios (2014) based on a different
data set which was put together in 2008 as part of an international study of household environment-related consumption.
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(1) X is an essential part of our culture (CULT X), (2) X is the right thing to do (RIGHT X), (3) X pro-
tects the environment (ENV IR X), and (4) there is social pressure to engage in X (PRESSURE X). In
addition to variables that reflect how activity X is viewed, we include a number of variables that measure on
a scale from 1 (no influence) to 5 (extremely influential) the level of influence of social (SOCIAL MOT X)
and moral (MORAL MOT X) motives and of several triggers, namely, local government’s support, lo-
cal government’s requirement, consumer organization’s involvement, and local media education programs.
To our knowledge, there are no studies, including the two mentioned above (Ferrara and Missios, 2012;
Ferrara and Missios, 2014), that look at the cultural, moral, and social dimensions of waste prevention
and address the questions of how the perception that waste prevention is a cultural, moral, or social phe-
nomenon plays out in waste prevention decisions, how moral and social considerations influence the level of
engagement in waste prevention, and how effective public/community support and education are as triggers
of waste prevention behaviour. Although there are studies that consider the impact of social and moral
motivations on recycling behaviour (e.g., Berglund, 2006; Halvorsen, 2008; Ferrara and Missios, 2012 and
2014), the questions around the cultural, moral, and social dimensions of recycling and the effectiveness of
public/community support and education as triggers of recycling behaviour are novel.
The availability of data on both motivations and triggers allows us to introduce interaction variables
to determine whether the effectiveness of triggers hinges upon the presence of motivations. According
to Fogg’s behaviour model (Fogg, 2009), for individuals to take target actions, they must have sufficient
motivation, sufficient ability, and an effective trigger. These three factors must be present at the same
instant for a target behaviour to occur; however, while there is some sort of trade-off between motivations
and abilities in the sense that the target behaviour can occur when ability is low provided that motivation is
high and vice versa, although both factors must be at some non-zero level, triggers are needed even when
both ability and motivation are high. Fogg speaks of a behaviour activation threshold, corresponding
graphically to the locus of the combinations of motivation and ability levels above (below) which triggers
can (cannot) induce the target behaviour, and of three types of triggers with functions linked to different
combinations of motivation and ability levels. When individuals are motivated but lack (or perceive to
lack) the ability to accomplish a task, a facilitator trigger is needed to emphasize the ease with which the
task can be carried out; when individuals are able but lack motivation, a spark trigger is needed which
includes a motivational element; when individuals are both able and motivated, a signal trigger is needed
to remind them of the task.
In his discussion of motivation, Fogg identifies three core motivators, each with two sides: the plea-
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sure/pain motivator, the hope/fear motivator, and the social acceptance/rejection motivator; hence, people
may act to feel pleasure or avoid pain, in the hope that something good is going to happen or out of fear that
something bad is going to happen, and/or to gain social approval or avoid social disapproval. In the context
of our study, we can capture these three motivators through a moral motivation variable which measures
the importance of feeling good about oneself (thus, pleasure), an environmental motivation variable which
relates to the anticipation of environmental benefits (thus, hope), and a social motivation variable which
measures the importance of neighbours (thus, social approval). Of the four triggers we are able to define
with the data collected, we can think of local government’s support and citizen/consumer organization’s
involvement as signal triggers if their function is to remind individuals of why activity X is important
or as spark triggers if their function is to motivate individuals to engage in X, likely through the social
acceptance/rejection motivator; as well, we can think of local media education programs as facilitator
triggers if they serve to simplify the task of engaging in X by highlighting ways in our daily lives in which
we can support X or as spark triggers if they serve to motivate through any of the three above mentioned
motivators. If, for a given ability level, triggers are more effective among highly motivated individuals, we
expect the signs of the coefficients associated with the variables interacting the three motivators with the
three triggers to be positive.
Two additional interaction variables we construct and include into the analysis address the question of
whether beliefs translate into motivations as we would expect: for individuals who believe that X is the
right thing to do, moral motives are likely to matter more in decisions about X; similarly, for individuals
who believe that there are social pressures to engage in X, social motives are likely to be of greater
relevance. Related to the above variables, we also consider the interaction between the belief that X is the
right thing to do and social motives and the interaction between the belief that there are social pressures
to engage in X and moral motives; the relevance of these interactions extends beyond the scope and focus
of this paper, which is about understanding waste management activities, to encompass a broader question
about whether moral and social considerations are consistent with one another, that is, whether we are
more or less likely to be socially (morally) motivated to take an action if we believe this action to be the
right thing to do (what society expects of us).
Although the local government requirement variable, which measures the importance of the fact that
the local government requires X, does not perfectly fit the definition of trigger and, thus, does not fall
into any of the three trigger categories Fogg describes, we include it into the analysis as a quasi-policy
instrument with an emphasis on whether being or feeling obliged to undertake specific tasks enhances or
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corrodes intrinsic motives to perform the tasks. Hence, we interact both the moral and social motivation
variables with the local government requirement variable to derive the effects of requiring X on moral and
social motivations and determine whether external intervention is perceived to be acknowledging, in which
case there is a crowding in of intrinsic motivation, or controlling, in which case there is a crowding out
of intrinsic motivation (Frey, 1999). As we detail below, the inclusion in the survey questionnaire of a
question about whether recycling is mandatory or voluntary allows us to explore the impact of mandating
recycling and the crowding in/out effects of the policy on intrinsic motivation for recycling directly, and
we thus do away with inferring the effect from whether and the extent to which the policy is believed to
matter in recycling decisions.
Finally, to complete the list of explanatory variables, we have policy or quasi-policy instruments which
include indicators for the presence of (real or perceived) unit pricing (UF REG and UF PER), a collection
program for recyclables (REC COLL), a drop-off program for recyclables (REC DROP ), and manda-
tory recycling (REC MAN), indicators for different frequencies of recyclables’ collection (REC FREQ),
indicators for different frequencies of garbage collection (GAR FREQ), and the proportions of the six re-
cyclable/compostable materials included in the questionnaire (glass, plastic, newspapers/magazines, card-
board, aluminum cans, and food waste) which are collected at the curb (N CURB), dropped off for cash
refund (N REF ), dropped off without payment (N UNREF ), and collected through occasional special
drives (N DRIV E).
Apropos of different recycling programs, we construct material-specific variables for inclusion in the
empirical modelling of recycling behaviour across different types of recyclables to capture the presence
of curbside collection, drop off for cash, drop off without cash, and special drive. For glass and plastic
containers and for aluminum cans with refundable deposits, we add a binary variable indicating whether
the refund for returning the container is full as opposed to partial; this variable only appears in the analysis
of refundable deposit systems.
In the recycling equations (both overall and material-specific), we include additional policy-like factors
to explore and comment on the time dimension of recycling and its impact on recycling behaviour to a far
greater extent than existing studies allow because of data limitations. In particular, we have indicators for
whether recycling requires (i) washing out containers, (ii) separating recyclables, (iii) bundling newspaper,
and/or (iv) cutting and bundling cardboard. We also have the length of time (in minutes) it takes to reach
the drop-off centre if available and the average amount of time (in minutes), excluding the time to reach
the drop-off centre if available, spent on recycling activities each week.
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To estimate the effect of unit pricing, we rely on the unit pricing variable which reflects locational
information, taking on a value of 1 if respondents are from PAYT regions (i.e., region 1 in the U.S.A.
and region 3 in Canada) and a value of zero otherwise; this variable identifies the actual presence of unit
pricing. On the other hand, the perceived presence of unit pricing, which is typical of household-level waste
management studies, is based on a question about how garbage collection is financed with several options
to choose amongst: property taxes, volume–based fee, weight-based fee, frequency-based fee, other, and
uncertain. As above noted, there is clearly a disconnect between how individuals actually pay for their
garbage collection and how they believe or perceive to be paying, and we thus have the opportunity to
engage in a more thorough investigation of the effects of unit pricing by separating between individuals
who are well informed and those who are not and, within the latter group, between individuals who are
misinformed and those who are uncertain. To this end, we introduce fixed effects to identify individuals
in (i) PAYT and non-PAYT communities who do not know how they pay for garbage collection, (ii)
PAYT communities who believe to be paying for garbage collection through property taxes, and (iii)
non-PAYT communities who believe to be paying for garbage collection through volume- or weight-based
fees. Focusing on being misinformed as opposed to being informed permits greater flexibility in how we
consider and classify individuals who report paying for garbage collection with frequency-based fees or
through some other mechanism. In defining the state of being misinformed, we need in fact only consider
instances in which property taxes represent the reported option in PAYT communities and volume- or
weight-based fees are the reported option in non-PAYT communities, thus allowing for the possibility that
the “frequency-based charge/price” and “other” options result from imperfect reporting, which may relate
to a particular reading of the relevant survey question, as opposed to misinformation.18 If there are obvious
differences across the various groups with regard to the effectiveness of unit pricing, we expect them to
have important policy implications. Finally, in order to comment on possible crowding in/out effects of
unit pricing, we rely on variables interacting unit pricing with moral and social motivations.
At last, to the list of explanatory variables, we add country-specific fixed effects to separate between
Canadian and U.S. responses as there may be institutional differences between the two countries not
captured in the other independent variables that amount to differences in waste management practices.
18Using the figures in Table A.6, we can easily compute the proportion of misinformed individuals among those who do not
report being unaware as 0.22, 0.09, 0.83, and 0.02 in regions 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. In Canada, the high proportion of
individuals in PAYT communities who believe to be paying for garbage collection through property taxes is troubling but, as
we note elsewhere, may result from less experience with unit pricing as well as from the presence of free bags in many of the
PAYT communities.
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3 Results
The significance of the estimated coefficients of correlation associated with the three dual combinations of
waste management strategies supports the methodological approach we adopt in this paper which takes
into account that an unsystematic effect on one activity may be accompanied by unsystematic effects on
the other activities. As one would expect, a random increase in waste disposal tends to correspond to
random decreases in both recycling and waste prevention while a random increase in recycling corresponds
to a random increase in waste prevention (see Table 1). We also find evidence of error correlation between
equations modelling different but related decisions in the simultaneous estimation of the recycling intensity
decisions over different recyclables, with results pointing to the tendency for unobservables that increase
recycling intensity for a particular recyclable to occur with unobservables that increase recycling intensity
for any of the other recyclables considered in the multi-equation model (see Table 2).
Across all areas, Canada tends to do better than the United States: Canadians, on average, dispose
of less waste, recycle more, and engage more in waste prevention. Canadians also do better in the re-
cycling of each of the items considered in the analysis (glass, plastic, newspapers/magazines, cardboard,
aluminum cans, and food waste), in the buying of containers that carry refundable deposits (glass and
plastic containers and aluminum cans), and in the returning of containers for refund. Based on marginal
effects computed at covariates’ mean values, Canadians are between 7 to 17 percentage points more likely
to recycle 100 percent of specific items, with the most significant difference in the recycling of newspa-
pers and magazines and cardboard, 6 percentage points more likely to engage in complete general (no
material-specific) recycling, and 16 percentage points more likely to curbside dispose of no more than one
standard-sized bag. But Canadians also tend to behave in a more environmentally sound manner in the
purchase of containers/cans returnable for refund and in the 100 percent return of containers/cans that
carry refundable deposits; Canadians are, in fact, 15, 19, and 25 percentage points more likely to buy
returnable plastic containers, aluminum cans, and glass containers, respectively, and they are 22, 24, and
28 percentage points more likely to return for refund 100 percent of aluminum cans, plastic containers, and
glass containers, respectively.
As we specifically control for the impact of environmental attitudes, we cannot attribute the system-
atic difference in waste management behaviour between the two countries to differences in environmental
consciousness. The environmental attitudes we cover in the study are however general, that is, about the
environment and, thus, not specific to waste and/or its environmental effects. It is then possible for the
systematic differences between the two countries to result from differences in the extent to which waste
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is perceived to contribute to environmental deterioration. Insofar as this perception is informed by how
actively governments engage with the problem of the waste associated with a product throughout the en-
tire life cycle of the product, differences in the two countries’ policy initiatives to tackle the environmental
cost of waste at the production stage may help explain why Canada tends to do better in handling its
waste problem at the household level. Whichever the reasons may be, including institutional and cultural
elements unrelated to the environment and/or waste, it goes without saying that, given the strength and
consistency of the results across the three waste management areas, the material-specific recycling decisions,
the decisions to buy containers/cans with refundable deposits, and the decisions to return containers/cans
for refunds, there is significant policy value in exploring these reasons more thoroughly and systematically
in order to identify key factors which, if accounted for, may contribute to formulating more effective policy
directions.
3.1 Waste Disposal, Recycling, and Prevention
3.1.1 Individual and Household Characteristics
Of the few individual characteristics we include in the analysis, the results in relation to the respondent’s
gender and age suggest that, on average, female individuals tend to recycle less but engage more in waste
prevention while age has a consistently positive environmental effect in that it results in less waste disposal,
more recycling, and more waste prevention.
At the household level, the number of individuals in any age group has a clearly positive effect on waste
disposal but not on the other waste management areas. For recycling, however, there is some evidence
that age-driven differences in the value of time may be at play in determining the extent of engagement in
the activity: having more members between 20 and 34 years of age reduces recycling while having more
members over 65 years of age increases recycling. For waste prevention, the only statistically significant
finding is that the number of children between 5 and 19 years of age has a positive effect on waste prevention,
likely stemming from the presence of a wider range of consumption products households must purchase in
order to meet the needs of this age cohort and the greater opportunities to engage in waste prevention they
then face when making their purchases. In households with more children, it is also possible for educational
motives to be present, which may explain the greater intensity in waste prevention, although one would
expect such motives to also translate in greater recycling efforts; however, in the recycling decision, there
may be some offsetting element at work as households with children are likely to have greater marginal
valuations of time which would negatively affect recycling intensity.
Education seems to matter systematically only in the waste disposal decision with more education
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amounting to less waste disposal, but there is some evidence that very high educational attainments (e.g.,
a university degree) trigger greater waste prevention. Income plays no clear role in the curbside disposal
and waste prevention decisions but has some systematic positive effect on recycling, at both the low and
high ends of the income distribution, which may be counter-intuitive based on the notion that recycling
is time-intensive and that high-income households face a higher opportunity cost of time and would thus
invest less time in recycling activities. The results about the controls that capture the time dimension of
recycling are however unconvincing: (1) even if there is some evidence that recycling intensity is increasing
in the amount of time devoted to recycling activities and decreasing in the amount of time required to
reach the drop-off centre, the estimated marginal effects are negligible; (2) of the various activities required
for recycling (e.g., washing, separating, bundling, and cutting), only bundling newspaper reduces recycling
and washing out containers actually increases recycling. Combined, the above two points suggest a weaker
role for time considerations in recycling decisions than theory would predict. The second point also stresses
that it is not the amount of time necessary to recycle that matters much but how convenient or immediate
the activity required for recycling is: while, during a given week, washing out containers may involve more
time than bundling newspapers, the former is immediate and permits recycling to take place as soon as the
product becomes disposable, but the latter requires some planning and prevents recycling from occurring
upon the product becoming disposable (newspapers need to be stored and piled up before bundling applies
and recycling can take place).
Finally, there is strong evidence, both in terms of the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients
and in terms of the consistency of their implications across the three waste-related activities, that those
who own their current residence have environmentally healthier waste management habits, that is, they
engage in less waste disposal, more recycling, and more waste prevention. We take this result to reflect
and stress the local or neighbourhood aspect of waste which derives from its more tangible features and
associated direct or private effects: waste is simply unpleasant to look at and smell, and individuals owning
their current residence are more likely to exhibit an attachment to their residence and area of residence
and be concerned with anything that threatens to devalue them. Living in a house (attached or detached)
has a statistically significant positive effect only on recycling, likely because of the storage requirements
that the activity entails and that a house is better equip to satisfy than an apartment.
3.1.2 Attitudinal Factors
In the empirical analysis, we account for several attitudinal factors, some of which are common across the
three activities while others are area-specific. Of the common factors, trust in various bodies (governments,
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environmental NGOs, and producers/retailers) plays no role in the waste disposal decision but affects both
recycling and waste prevention activities, the reason being likely related to the greater relevance of product
characteristics in the recycling and waste prevention decisions. A summary of the effects of attitudinal
variables in provided in Table 1a. Interestingly, the belief that governments are trustworthy tends to lower
both recycling and waste prevention, a result which may suggest some substitutability in, or shifting of,
social responsibilities when it comes to matters involving indirect costs/benefits: if individuals have trust
in governments, they may have confidence in the policy framework in place to tackle the waste problem
and may then be less concerned about altering their behaviour to alleviate the problem.
Being concerned about the environment only conditions waste prevention, and this result likely exploits
the timing differences across the three waste management activities and the informational disconnect be-
tween different disposal options and their environmental implications. Waste prevention is a pre-production
stage decision, that is, it occurs before waste is produced; curbside disposal and recycling take place after
waste production. It is then rather natural to expect that a concern for the environment kicks in as a
motivating factor when it can have the greatest impact, when it can matter the most. At the same time,
unless there is a clear understanding that waste has a profound detrimental effect on the environment and
that recycling is a less environmentally damaging disposal option than curbside disposal, a concern for the
environment is not likely to be of relevance at the disposal stage. These points underscore the importance
of perceiving to have the ability to make a difference: we may be concerned about the environment but,
unless we perceive that we contribute to a better environment, we may not be willing to alter our be-
haviour. This message comes up quite pronouncedly when we look at the effect of individuals’ belief that
they can contribute to a better environment: the stronger the belief is, the more engaged in recycling and
waste prevention but the less engaged in curbside disposal people are.
Garbage Recycling Prevention
ENVCNCRN 0.0128 0.0008 0.0713***
BETTRENV -0.0461*** 0.0358* 0.0901***
CULT X 0.0782*** 0.0388***
RIGHT X 0.2393*** 0.1899***
ENVIR X 0.0309 0.0787***
PRESSURE X -0.0898** 0.0193
MORAL MTV X -0.0543 0.1263***
SOCIAL MTV X 0.1391* -0.005
Table 1a. Summary of coefficients of attitudinal variables of interest. See full Table 1.
Consistently with the above line of reasoning, negative environmental attitudes, as reflected in individ-
uals’ belief that environmental impacts are overstated, that environmental issues are for future generations
to address or for technological progress to resolve, or that environmental policies should not involve a
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monetary cost, tend to intensify participation in curbside disposal while weakening participation in recy-
cling but not to negatively alter waste prevention practices. The apparent oddity in the response (or lack
thereof) of waste prevention intensity to negative environmental attitudes when we take their effects on
recycling and curbside disposal into account warrants some discussion. A key intrinsic difference between
waste prevention and waste disposal is that the former is an ex-ante activity about preventing a problem
while the latter, which comprises both curbside disposal and recycling, is an ex-post activity about dealing
with the problem. The implication of this difference is that individuals are the only players in the waste
prevention decision and thus retain full control; on the contrary, they share responsibility with govern-
ments (or disposal service providers) in dealing with the waste problem at the disposal stage. Negative
environmental attitudes can then trigger a shift in responsibility away from the individuals when responsi-
bility sharing occurs, thus increasing curbside disposal and decreasing recycling, and may motivate greater
engagement in the fully controlled activity (i.e., waste prevention), as the case when there is strong belief
that environmental policies should be costless.
The second set of attitudinal variables we consider pertains solely to recycling and waste prevention.
For both activities, the cultural and moral dimensions are quite significant: the extent to which each
activity is believed to be part of our culture or the right thing to do increases its intensity. However,
the belief that there is social pressure to engage in the activity has no impact on waste prevention and
actually reduces recycling. Nevertheless, social motives (via the influence of neighbours) matter in the
recycling decision, and more so when social pressure is high, but not in the waste prevention decision,
and moral motives (via the influence of feeling good about oneself) impact waste prevention but not
recycling. In addition to emphasizing the social aspect of recycling versus the individual aspect of waste
prevention, these results underscore a couple of peculiar features of social pressure, namely, that an action
must be observable for the impact of social pressure to materialize and that social pressure undermines
or does away with our ability to function as individuals and can therefore lead to undesirable outcomes.
Elaborating on the second feature, what we have here is a situation in which the antipodal relationship
between the “social” and the “individual” embodied in the concept of social pressure clearly comes up:
people are influenced by neighbours but still feel in control of their actions (in a sense, it is their choice
to be influenced by neighbours); however, people react negatively to the idea that they must behave in a
particular way because it is what society desires.
When we examine the effects of the various interaction terms involving moral and social factors, we find
a supporting relationship between the belief that an activity is the right thing to do and moral motives
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and between the belief that there is social pressure to engage in an activity and social motives. The
tendency is, in fact, for the effect of social motives to be stronger in both the recycling decision and the
waste prevention decision when there is social pressure to engage and for the effect of moral motives to be
stronger, but only in the recycling decision, when engagement is viewed as the right thing to do. For both
recycling and waste prevention, however, the belief that engagement is a civic duty (i.e., the right thing
to do) erodes social motivation while the belief that engagement is what society expects does not affect
moral motivation.
As we delve into the social and moral dimensions of waste management decisions, a general message
we can draw from our findings is that social pressure is a more complicated channel through which we can
modify behaviour because it is (or is perceived to be) controlling and thus requires that it be managed
subtly in a manner that does not challenge or undermine the individuality of decision making. Although
individuals are sensitive and responsive to the views of their peers (e.g., recyclers in the neighbourhood),
especially when such views are resonant of social expectations, they react negatively to the notion of social
conformity. Furthermore, in motivating behaviour, the relevance of the desire to feel good about ourselves
(i.e., moral motivation) is unlikely to be conditioned by whether we believe that our actions meet social
norms; conversely, the relevance of the desire to gain our peers’ approval or avoid their disapproval (i.e.,
social motivation) is likely intertwined with the belief that our actions meet moral norms but in a non-
supporting type of association which highlights the negative connotation of societally influenced acting
stemming from its relativity and instability.
The remaining results are consistent with the view that waste prevention is inherently an individualistic
activity which underpins the individual’s ability to have an impact, while recycling is inherently a collec-
tivist activity which underpins the collective’s ability to make a difference. As such, recycling responds to
factors that involve multiple agents in society (i.e., social considerations) in ways waste prevention does
not. Hence, while having a government supporting an activity, which we treat as a signal or reminder of
the importance of the activity, has a significant and positive effect on both recycling and waste prevention,
the extent of agreement with the belief that the activity protects the environment increases waste preven-
tion but has no effect on recycling whose environmental benefits through individual efforts are likely to be
viewed as negligible. And while having a government requiring an activity or having a citizen/consumer
organization involved in the activity does not matter in waste prevention for which the decision-making
unit has or perceives to have full control of the activity’s impact, it does reduce recycling possibly because
of the negative reaction to imposition or to the idea of imposition or because of the opportunity of shifting
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responsibility from the individual to the citizen/consumer organization or because of some negative signal
the involvement of the citizen/consumer organization sends if there is, for example, limited trust in such
organization.
As a final note in this sub-section, none of the three triggers (government’s support, citizen/consumer
organization’s involvement, and local media education programs) appears to be more effective at encour-
aging recycling among highly motivated individuals. On the contrary, there is some statistically significant
interaction between the social acceptance motivator and the three triggers in the waste prevention decision;
specifically, citizen/consumer organization’s involvement and local media education programs correlate pos-
itively, whereas government’s support correlates negatively, with social motives, a result which indicates
that, the more socially motivated individuals are, the less likely it is for their waste prevention efforts to
respond positively to government’s support and negatively to citizen/consumer organization’s involvement
and local media education programs.
In general, the evidence around triggers highlights that having a government supporting recycling and
waste prevention can be a more effective signal than citizen/consumer organization’s involvement or local
media education programs, possibly because of the pertinency of the “leading by example” message given
the leadership role the government plays; however, when individuals feel pressured to act in a particular
way, they are less prone to view such support through positive lenses.
3.1.3 Policy Variables
The last set of variables we include in the analysis comprises policy or quasi-policy instruments. A summary
of the effects of the policy variables in provided in Table 1b.The primary policy tool is unit pricing which
turns out to be statistically significant in all decisions. Specifically, the presence of user fees decreases
curbside waste and increases both recycling and waste prevention; this effect holds independently of how
we define the presence of unit pricing, that is, using the locational information we have (see Table 1) or
based on the responses to the question about the type of financing mechanism in adoption in the community
of residence, although the marginal effect of the perceived presence of unit pricing is consistently stronger
across the three areas (see Table 5). Furthermore, in the latter case, that is, when we rely on the stated
presence of unit pricing and thus add to the analysis covariates to explore the effects of uncertainty and
misinformation,19 we find that uncertainty about the financing of garbage collection reduces curbside
19To avoid redundancy, we do not include the entire set of results from the estimation involving individuals’ responses in
the construction of the indicator for the presence of unit pricing. Instead, we focus on key factors (e.g., unit pricing and its
interactions with other covariates) and sum up the corresponding marginal effects in Table 5. Included in Table 5, we also
have relevant findings, when the presence of unit pricing is based on individuals’ responses, from the material-specific analysis
of recycling and from the analysis of refundable deposit systems.
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disposal and increases recycling only in PAYT communities but lowers waste prevention in both PAYT
and non-PAYT communities. On the other hand, households in PAYT communities who believe to be
paying for garbage collection services out of property taxes tend to dispose of less garbage at the curb
but do not exhibit a systematically different behaviour in recycling and waste prevention; correspondingly,
households in non-PAYT communities who believe to be paying for curbside garbage by volume or weight
tend to engage in more curbside disposal and less recycling but exert a similar level of engagement in waste
prevention.
Garbage Recycling Prevention
UF REG -0.2163*** 0.3018*** 0.0801*
REC COLL 0.4970***
REC DROP 0.0505*
REC MAN 0.2796***
N CURB 0.9936***
N REF -0.032
N UNREF 0.2561***
Table 1b. Summary of coefficients of policy effects of interest. See full Table 1.
In exploiting the implications of the estimated effects associated with the uncertainty and misinforma-
tion variables, we come to four reflections worthy of mention: (1) uncertainty and misinformation about the
payment structure in place to finance garbage collection affect waste management persistently only in areas
directly linked to the structure, namely, curbside disposal and, to a lesser extent, recycling; (2) uncertainty
and misinformation do not prevent the realization of the intended immediate benefit of unit pricing (i.e.,
a decrease in curbside disposal); (3) uncertainty serves as a cautionary stimulus in the decision of how
much garbage to discard; (4) misinformation is more about what financing mechanisms mean conceptually
than practically. An important innuendo of the above reflections is that economic incentives can and do
work, and are thus powerful tools to modify behaviour, even when individuals are uncertain about, or
unaware of, their existence, although they may not be able to fully internalize how these incentives affect
activities related to the policy target; in the waste management context, uncertain/misinformed individu-
als do account for unit pricing when choosing their curbside disposal level but fall short of considering its
implications in the recycling decision and/or in the waste prevention decision.
The evidence on the possible crowding out of intrinsic (moral or social) motivation resulting from the
implementation of unit pricing is not particularly compelling. In fact, the presence of unit pricing based
on locational information reduces the effect of moral motives in the recycling decision but such motives do
not appear to affect recycling behaviour; the presence of unit pricing based on survey responses reduces the
effect of social motives in the waste prevention decision which is, however, independent of social motives.
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Also unconvincing is the evidence in support of the hypothesis that requiring an activity crowds out intrinsic
motivation: the interaction between the strength of influence of having a governmental mandate in place
and intrinsic motivation (moral or social) is of no relevance in recycling decisions, although mandatory
recycling does increase recycling, but the effect of moral motives on waste prevention tends to be lower
among individuals for whom the requirement is more influential.
Having either a collection program or a drop-off program for recycling promotes recycling but the former
has a stronger effect (χ2(1) = 56.82). Consistently, as the proportion of recyclables which are collected
at the curb or dropped off without payment increases, recycling intensifies, again with the effect under
the curb option dominating (χ2(1) = 135.82); on the other hand, recycling is decreasing in the proportion
of recyclables which are collected through occasional special drives. Indeed, regularity in the collection
of recyclables matters in encouraging recycling but the impact exhibits a non-monotic relationship with
frequency, increasing as frequency decreases from weekly to every two weeks (χ2(1) = 2.88) and eventually
becoming statistically insignificant for monthly collections. A similar result holds for curbside garbage but
the impact of pick-up frequency, while also increasing initially as collection becomes less frequent (from
twice a week to weekly), does not vanish at the monthly option; on the contrary, the impact remains
constant, statistically speaking, at the weekly level as frequency decreases to every two weeks to once per
month.20 When testing for impact equivalence between the two waste management options, we find that
the effect of the most frequent collection is statistically the same between curbside disposal and recycling
(χ2(1) = 0.03) but the largest effect on curbside disposal at the once per week pick up exceeds that on
recycling at the every two weeks pick up (χ2(1) = 4.45).
Finally, in terms of the cross effects of collection frequency, we find that (1) curbside disposal intensity
is unresponsive to weekly collection of recyclables but increases at an increasing rate as collection becomes
less frequent, (2) recycling intensity only decreases if curbside waste is collected twice a week, and (3)
waste prevention does not respond to how often curbside waste is collected but increases when recyclables
are collected once per week or every two weeks. For both frequencies, indirect effects do not necessarily
align with direct effects, which suggests that, from a policy perspective, the frequency choice would re-
quire a weighing of the two types of effects according to their magnitudes and environmental implications.
Notwithstanding, the evidence does highlight that how frequently recyclables are collected is a more con-
sequential decision both in terms of the scale and the scope of its effects and, as a result, the decision has
20The χ2 values associated with the hypotheses that the effects of the four frequency options are equal, that the effects of
all frequency options but the twice per week option are equal, and that the effect of the twice per week option is equal to that
of the once per week option are χ2(3) = 31.58, χ2(2) = 0.33, and χ2(1) = 30.78, respectively, so that we cannot accept the first
and third hypotheses.
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a more salient strategic dimension.
3.2 Material-Specific Recycling
The results from the material-specific analysis of recycling are mostly consistent with those from the
analysis of overall recycling, although there are some differences across recyclables, especially between food
waste and the other recyclables (see Table 2). In what follows, we focus on these differences as well as on
notable discrepancies between overall recycling and material-specific recycling, particularly when marginal
effects are sizable.
We begin by emphasizing that Canada’s stronger commitment to recycling carries over to the full
range of individual recyclables considered in the analysis but is particularly noticeable in the recycling of
newspapers/magazines and cardboard, with Canadians being 16 and 15 percentage points more likely to
recycle 100 percent of the items whereas the gap in likelihood for overall recycling sits at 6 percentage
points. Attitudinal effects for material-specific recycling are in provided in Table 2a and policy effects in
Table 2b.
Glass Plastic Newspaper Cardboard Cans Food
ENVCNCRN 0.007 -0.024 -0.013 -0.008 -0.002 -0.092***
BETTRENV 0.004 0.01 0.009 0.009 -0.001 -0.002
CULT REC 0.058*** 0.092*** 0.074*** 0.077*** 0.062*** 0.041
RIGHT REC 0.321*** 0.267*** 0.326*** 0.286*** 0.245*** 0.241**
ENVIR REC -0.02 0.005 -0.005 -0.008 0.069 -0.03
PRESSURE REC -0.107** -0.067 -0.029 -0.039 -0.059 -0.180**
MORAL MTV REC -0.086 0.028 0.079 0.015 -0.009 -0.038
SOCIAL MTV REC 0.169** 0.061 -0.026 0.042 0.05 -0.004
Table 2a. Summary of attitudinal effects of interest on material-specific recycling. See full Table 2.
The household’s age distribution matters only sporadically: in addition to the negative effect of age 20 to
34 on the recycling of newspapers/magazines and to the positive effect of being over 65 on composting, both
of which mirror the effects on overall recycling, there is some evidence that a thicker left tail representing
the under 4 and between 5 and 19 years of age groups lowers the recycling of certain items (cardboard and
cans for both groups; glass and newspapers/magazines for the latter group).
Of the household characteristics, income is the most relevant across all recyclables but food waste whose
recycling, unlike overall recycling, is income-invariant. That recycling efforts are increasing in income seems
at odds with the notion that, as income increases, the opportunity cost of time increases, and we should
thus observe less engagement in a time-consuming activity like recycling. But, as for overall recycling,
the marginal effects of the covariates that capture more directly the time dimension of recycling (i.e.,
time spent on recycling activities and time required to reach the drop center) are negligible when they
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are statistically significant, suggesting that the opportunity cost of time reflected in the income level may
not be an important consideration in recycling decisions. Given the insignificance of all of the education
categories, income, which tends to be highly correlated with education, may be reflective of the likely
positive influence of education.
The relevance of the time dimension of recycling also comes into question on account of the effects of
such requirements as washing (for glass, plastic, and aluminum cans), bundling (for newspapers/magazines
and cardboard), and cutting (for cardboard), effects which are either positive (e.g., washing) or statistically
insignificant (e.g., bundling and cutting). Separation, on the other hand, while it has no impact on overall
recycling, does reduce the recycling of every type of recyclable but leaves composting, or the recycling
of food waste, unchanged; arguably, however, the impact of separation may be capturing more than just
a time investment concern but a storage concern in that several bins would need to be available for the
separated items. How important the concern for storage is likely rests upon space availability which is a
less pressing consideration if living in a house. Now, having storage requirements may not always be a
driving force in the recycling decision as other factors, such as safety and odours, may prevail. Indeed,
in the material-specific analysis of recycling, the statistically significant positive effect of living in a house
does not show up in the recycling of glass, for which safety may be a greater concern, and of food waste,
for which odours may represent a more relevant concern.
For many of the remaining covariates, the recycling of food waste exhibits some unique features which
set it apart from the recycling of the other recyclables as well as from overall recycling. What underpins
the uniqueness of food waste is the likely perception that it has a lower recyclability potential than the
other waste materials because of the absence of tangible reusable items or that the environmental benefit
of recycling it, as opposed to landfilling it, is of smaller scale than for the other recyclables because of its
higher biodegradation rate. For instance, the belief that governments are trustworthy does not tend to
reduce composting, presumably because the possibility of shifting environmental responsibilities to reliable
governments is less meaningful when environmental impacts are perceived to be modest. Consistently,
negative environmental attitudes (i.e., the belief that environmental policies should not entail a monetary
cost, that environmental issues are for future generations to address or technological progress to resolve, or
that environmental impacts are overstated) have no impact on food waste recycling but reduce the recycling
of the other waste items even if unsystematically across the four convictions (e.g., plastic recycling is not
responsive to how firmly individuals believe in environmental impacts being overstated or future generations
being responsible for addressing environmental issues). The possibility of sharing the responsibility of
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environmental mitigation we discuss above in our attempt to explain response differences between ex-post
activities (i.e., waste disposal and recycling) and ex-ante activities (i.e., waste prevention) is thus less likely
to be a relevant consideration in the food waste recycling decision which has a stronger personal dimension
than the recycling decision over any other recyclable.
Glass Plastic Newspaper Cardboard Cans Food
UF REG 0.176* 0.269*** 0.12 0.263*** 0.224** 0.02
REC COLL 0.175** 0.136** 0.114* 0.163** 0.226*** 0.048
REC DROP -0.033 -0.012 0.005 -0.004 -0.013 0.081**
REC MAN 0.050* 0.087*** 0.081*** 0.068** 0.053* 0.342***
CURB Y 0.246*** 0.169*** 0.196*** 0.193*** 0.015 0.138
DP C Y 0.120*** 0.258*** 0.044 0.027 0.359*** 0.069
DP NC Y -0.037 -0.071** -0.001 -0.065** -0.048 0.076
Table 2b. Summary of policy effects of interest on material-specific recycling. See full Table 2.
But the more individualistic peculiarity of composting also surfaces in its invariance to the belief that
composting is part of our culture or to the involvement of a citizen/consumer organization and in its
negative responsiveness to local media education programs or to the belief that there is social pressure to
engage in the activity even if the peer effect via neighbours’ influence is absent. In regard to social pressure
and social motives (via the influence of neighbours), glass is the only recyclable for which the results from
the analysis of overall recycling hold, namely, that individuals respond negatively to the imposition of
pressure but are influenced positively by their neighbours; in all of the other cases, with the exception of
food waste, social pressure and social motives are inconsequential. In spite of the differences, the conclusion
that social pressure may not be an effective tool to modify behaviour still stands.
Other salient features of food waste recycling which separates it from the recycling of the other waste
items concern the effects of policy instruments, most notably of unit pricing, pick-up frequencies, curbside
collection, and drop-off programs. The key result is that the presence of unit pricing does not condition
the decision over the intensity of food waste recycling, although, interestingly, the perceived presence of
unit pricing does, with a marginal effect on the probability of recycling 100 percent of recyclable food
waste equal to 17 percentage points (see Table 5). While we are not able to explain the reason for this
discrepancy, we do note that food waste is the only recyclable for which the belief that garbage collection
is financed out of property taxes when a unit pricing system is in place increases recycling, contrary to
our theoretical expectations. But the effect of misinformation in recycling decisions seems to be at odds
with our theoretical priors more generally in that the overall recycling intensity is lower when individuals
not subjected to user fees believe to be paying user fees for garbage collection, a result which we obtain
in the material-specific analysis only for the decision about recycling cans. A common feature between
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aluminum can recycling and food waste recycling, which may be linked to their theory-inconsistent reaction
to misinformation, is the discrepancy in impact between actual unit pricing and perceived unit pricing, with
aluminum can recycling increasing in the former but unresponsive to the latter and food waste recycling
unresponsive to the former but increasing in the latter.
Having a collection program for recyclables has no bearing on food waste recycling but increases the
recycling of any other type of recyclables; on the contrary, having a drop-off program for recyclables
increases food waste recycling but has no effect on the recycling of everything else. When we consider
material-specific collection programs, we find composting to be consistently unresponsive to the presence
of any program (curbside, drop off for cash, drop off without cash, and special drive) while recycling
intensity tends to be increasing in the presence of curbside collection for all of the other waste items
but cans, increasing in the presence of a drop-off program for cash for all of the other waste items but
newspapers/magazines and cardboard, and decreasing in the presence of a drop-off program without cash
for plastic and cardboard. In no specific instance, the presence of special drives matters, although overall
recycling does decrease with the number of recyclables collected through occasional special drives.
Finally, a striking difference between composting and the recycling of the other waste items emerges in
the impact of collection fequencies, with more frequent collections (weekly and every two weeks) having no
effect on composting and less frequent collections (monthly) increasing composting, whereas the response
of material-specific recycling to variation in collection frequency for any other waste material mirrows that
of overall recycling which amounts to a positive effect at high frequency and no affect at low frequency.
3.3 Refundable Deposit Systems
In the analysis of refundable deposit systems, which covers glass and plastic containers and aluminum
cans, we include a much smaller set of covariates for two reasons: (1) many of the covariates we have at
our disposal relate to a specific waste management option (recycling or waste prevention) and are thus not
applicable to the buying and returning decisions over containers/cans with refundable deposits; (2) some
covariates (e.g., gender, household age distribution, education) turn out to have consistently statistically
insignificant effects across all returnable-for-refund items, and we thus omit them altogether in the final
estimation iteration. To be clear, the covariates we initially consider in this section, before omission due
to consistent statistical insignificance, are the same as those we include in the curbside disposal equation
with the exception of the pick-up frequency indicators but with the addition of an indicator for a curbside
recycling program being available and an indicator for the deposit being fully, as opposed to partially,
refundable. Attitudinal effects for refundable deposit systems are in summarized in Table 3a and policy
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effects in Table 3b.
Ordered Probit Binary Probit
Return Glass Return Plastic Return Cans Buy Glass Buy Plastic Buy Cans
ENVCNCRN 0.0344* 0.0483** 0.025
BETTRENV 0.0639** 0.0774*** 0.0842*** 0.0457** 0.0403* 0.0379*
Table 3a. Summary of attitudinal effects of interest under refundable deposit systems. See full Table 3.
In terms of methodology, we initially apply an ordered probit procedure for the return intensity decision
with sample selection involving the choice of whether to buy containers/cans with refundable deposits.
As noted in an earlier section, we conjecture that the decision of whether to buy containers/cans with
refundable deposits may be influenced by the proportion of containers individuals would return for refund,
in which case we would expect the error term in the buying decision equation to be correlated with the
error term in the return intensity decision equation. The estimation results from the ordered probit model
with sample selection do, however, support our hypothesis only for glass containers and suggest a negative
correlation between the outcome errors and the selection errors; specifically, unobservables that increase
the proportion of glass containers returned for refund tend to occur with unobservables that decrease
the likelihood of buying glass containers with refundable deposits. Hence, we retain the ordered probit
sample-selection model only for glass containers (see Table 3) and model the purchase and return intensity
decisions over plastic containers and aluminum cans separately, that is, via a binary probit model for the
purchase decision and an ordered probit model for the return intensity decision, but we also provide the
disjoint estimation of the participation and intensity probabilities for glass containers (see Table 4).
That individuals tend to take into account their return intensity plan when deciding whether to buy
glass containers but not when deciding whether to buy plastic containers or aluminum cans has likely to
do with the peculiar characteristics of glass which make its disposal a more restrictive process than the
disposal of plastic and aluminum and/or with the type of content/drink which typically comes in glass
containers. Unlike unreturned plastic containers and aluminum cans, unreturned glass containers cannot
be easily crushed and placed in a garbage bag for curbside disposal and the buying of glass when non-
glass options exist is thus more likely to entail a commitment to recycling or returning the glass item.
More coordination between the buying and the returning decisions involving glass containers, which would
underlie the presence of correlation between unobservables affecting the two decisions, may also arise if
the use of glass containers tends to be confined to specific types of content/drink that require special but
regular trips to the point of purchase (e.g., liquor stores). Interestingly, having a curbside recycling program
has no effect on the purchase and return decisions over glass containers but does impact the two decisions
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for plastic containers and aluminum cans, reducing the purchase propensity in both cases but encouraging
the return of plastic containers while discouraging the return of aluminum cans. The ineffectiveness of a
curbside recycling program in the decisions over glass containers is symptomatic of the correlation between
the buying and the returning decisions over glass containers likely due to the specificity of their content.
From the results we report in Table 4, aside from the previously noted high statistical significance of
the coefficients associated with the country indicator which is indicative of Canadians’ greater disposition
towards buying containers/cans with refundable deposits and returning them for refund, the four factors
which we find to be consistently relevant in the two decisions and, within each decision, across different
types of returnable item are the respondent’s age, the presence of unit pricing, whether the deposit is fully
refundable, and the extent to which individuals believe that they can contribute to a better environment.
Both the presence of a full refund and the belief that individual pro-environmental practices can make a
difference encourage the purchase and return for refund decisions, but the former covariate’s marginal effect
on the purchase decision tends to be larger than that on the 100 percent return decision: in comparison to a
partial refund, a full refund increases the buying probability by 58 to 74 percentage points while increasing
the 100 percent returning probability by 15 to 21 percentage points. The respondent’s age, however, affects
the two decisions differently, decreasing the probability of purchasing items with refundable deposits but
increasing their return intensity.
Ordered Probit Binary Probit
Return Glass Return Plastic Return Cans Buy Glass Buy Plastic Buy Cans
UF REG -0.1413*** -0.1711*** -0.1282*** -0.1260*** -0.2212*** -0.1898***
CURB Z 0.0697 0.1279*** -0.2035*** 0.0065 -0.0989*** -0.1922***
RD TYPE Z 0.4064*** 0.5652*** 0.4835*** 1.5725*** 2.0608*** 1.7760***
Table 3b. Summary of policy effects of interest under refundable deposit systems. See full Table 3.
The presence of unit pricing, however, has a perverse impact on both decisions but the significance of
this result is not at all clear as, unlike in the other two empirical analyses, there is noticeable inconsistency
in impact between actual presence and perceived presence of unit pricing. In fact, from Table 5, we note
that the reported presence of unit pricing is irrelevant in both the decision of whether to buy items with
refundable deposits and the decision over the proportion of returnable items to return. At the same time,
uncertainty about the payment structure has a consistently negative effect only on the buying decision and
in PAYT communities while misinformation has a negative effect on both decisions in PAYT communities
and a positive effect only on the buying decision in non-PAYT communities. Hence, based on the effects
of the misinformation variables, individuals who believe to be paying user fees for curbside garbage are
more likely to buy items with refundable deposits while individuals who believe to be paying for garbage
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collection through property taxes are less likely to buy such items and, if they do buy them, are less likely
to return them in large proportions.
What is driving the negative effect of the actual presence of unit pricing is then uncertainty and
misinformation, both of which consistently sway residents of PAYT communities away from items with
refundable deposits. Although the perceived presence of unit pricing is statistically insignificant, the effects
of the two misinformation variables may suggest a role for unit pricing in encouraging individuals to resort
to items with refundable deposits, possibly through a strengthening of the understanding of the inherent
interconnection between waste prevention and waste production. In line with the results about managing
waste through curbside disposal, recycling, and waste prevention, uncertainty and misinformation tend
to work against the realization of the potential benefits of unit pricing in aspects of waste management
not directly linked to unit pricing (i.e., waste prevention and, to a lesser extent, recycling). Arguably,
uncertainty and misinformation may reflect a lack of appreciation of the holistic nature of the waste problem
and of the complementaries and substitutabilites that may exist among different strategies available to
tackle it.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we pursue a comprehensive analysis of household waste management, consistent with the
“three R’s” approach of policy bodies, by considering all at once the three channels (i.e., waste disposal,
recycling, and waste prevention) through which households can address their waste problem, particularly
in response to policy initiatives targetting one or more of such channels. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first study that, owing to the data set at its disposal, examines level (or intensity) decisions in
the three waste-related areas simultaneously and allows for the possibility of linkages through unobserv-
ables. While we can express the level of engagement in each activity in reduced form and thus only as a
function of exogenous variables, it is reasonable to expect unsystematic factors affecting one activity to
have ramifications for the other two activities. Our empirical specification thus involves (i) a system of
three equations, corresponding to the three waste management activities, which are related to one another
through jointly normally distributed errors, (ii) data-generating processes which are mixed as we have
two kinds of dependent variables (categorical for waste disposal and recycling and continuous for waste
prevention), and (iii) determinants which vary by equation. We adopt a similar specification, but within
a six-equation model with the same kind of dependent variables, when we examine the recycling decision
across six different types of recyclables. In both instances, the results do provide strong support for the
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presence of error correlation in each pairing of activities and resonate with the expectation that a shock
boosting environmental engagement in one area has pro-environment implications in the other areas.
Aside from the empirical strategy and the holistic approach to the investigation of household waste
management activities, which encompass waste prevention, an area not adequately explored in previous
studies because of a lack of direct measures of engagement in source reduction, we contribute to the re-
lated literature by extending the analysis to the decisions of buying and returning recyclables that carry
refundable deposits. Key findings here are that individuals tend to take into account their return intensity
plan only when deciding whether to buy glass containers and engage more actively with the purchase and
return of items with refundable deposits when a full refund is in place or if they believe that their pro-
environmental practices can make a difference but do not respond favorably to the presence of user fees.
But a finding worth emphasizing because of its robustness and consistency across the three empirical anal-
yses is that Canada’s environmental performance as reflected in households’ waste management practices
exceeds the corresponding environmental performance in the United States. While we cannot attribute
the systematic difference in waste management behaviour between the two countries to differences in envi-
ronmental consciousness, which we specifically account for in our empirical specifications, we recognize the
policy relevance of isolating the reasons for such a stark result and speculate that differences in the extent
to which waste is perceived to contribute to environmental deterioration or differences in policy initiatives
to tackle the environmental cost of waste at the production stage may be at play.
Employing a data set from a household survey specifically designed to address data limitations in the
literature, we also provide a more robust assessment of unit pricing systems, which represent the one
market-based policy instrument available to municipal governments in their efforts to manage household
waste more efficiently and effectively, by working with a more policy-balanced sample and with actual, as
opposed to perceived, presence of user charges. In the absence of sample stratification by policy, existing
household-level studies find no support for the hypothesis that user charges yield positive environmental
effects by inducing households to opt for more environmentally friendly waste management options (e.g.,
recycling), a finding that is likely attributable to the fact that said studies rely on samples that are under-
represented in terms of observations from communities with some sort of pay-as-you-throw programme
(about 10 percent). On the contrary, our evidence suggests that economic incentives can and do work,
with no clear-cut crowding out implications for intrinsic motivations, and are thus powerful tools to modify
behaviour, even when individuals are uncertain about, or unaware of, their existence.
Furthermore, without policy stratification, studies to date gather information about user fees via a
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survey question, the answer to which can only give whether the respondent believes to be paying user
fees for garbage bags/cans placed at the curb. With policy stratification, coupled with a survey question
about the type of payment scheme in place for garbage collection services, we are able to measure the
actual presence of user fees and compare its effects to those of the perceived presence of user fees; based on
this comparison, we can then arrive at a couple of interesting policy-relevant statements which stress the
importance of information, namely: (i) there is quite a bit of discrepancy between how garbage collection
is financed and how individuals perceive it to be financed, but being misinformed about the presence
of user fees is likely a function of time, expected to decline in frequency as more experience with the
unit pricing program accumulates; (ii) uncertainty and misinformation about how garbage collection is
financed do not have negative repercussions in the curbside disposal decision and, to a lesser extent, in the
recycling decision, but uncertain/misinformed individuals may not always account for the implications of
unit pricing in the broader waste management context, a result which we may interpret as underscoring the
need for information diffusion investments to highlight the substitutability possibilities that exist across
waste management options.
Being more policy-balanced and including actual information about user fees are not the only important
features of the data set. The richness of the data set stems, in fact, from its comprehensive coverage of non-
economic elements/influences which stress the social, moral, and cultural facets of environmental decisions
and allow us to provide an empirical examination of Fogg’s behaviour model (Fogg, 2009) according to
which any target behaviour requires sufficient motivation and ability and an effective trigger but, while
there is a trade off between motivation and ability, a trigger must always be present. Of the three core
motivators Fogg defines, we find pleasure and hope to affect waste prevention decisions and social approval
to affect recycling decisions and speculate that the difference in impact reflects the more individualistic
nature of waste prevention and more collectivist nature of recycling. Ability, or the belief of being able
to contribute to a better environment, matters across all waste management options, and the one trigger
that works in promoting engagement in recycling and waste prevention is government’s support which we
treat as a signal or reminder of the importance of the supported activity.
Other interesting results in our analysis of the three waste management options corresponding to the
three “R’s” which deserve consideration in policy design exercises include: (i) the greater role of trust
in recycling and waste prevention decisions seemingly attributable to the greater relevance of product
characteristics; (ii) the possible negative connotation of governmental trust as individuals may choose
to engage less extensively in recycling and waste prevention if they can rely on (or trust) the policy
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framework in place; (iii) timing differences across the three waste management activities, with waste
prevention occuring before waste production (when individuals have control over the environmental impact
of their choices) and recycling and curbside disposal occuring after waste production (when individuals
can partially shift to governments the responsibility of dealing with their waste problem), and their more
favorable implications for the effects of environmental attitudes on waste prevention; (iv) the controlling
aspect of social pressure which manifests itself in individuals being responsive to the views of their peers
but reacting negatively to the notion of social conformity as it undermines the individuality of decision
making; (v) the weaker role of time considerations in recycling decisions coupled with the greater emphasis
on convenience and immediacy of activities in support of recycling (e.g., washing out containers may require
more time but is more immediate than bundling newspapers).
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